In the United States, the Obama administration will continue to follow the China strategy established in the President’s first term. Over the past four years President Obama has pursued a nuanced and balanced approach to the U.S.-China relationship. Where the President has seen opportunities for win-win cooperation with China, he has not hesitated to pursue them. Where U.S. and Chinese interests have conflicted, the President has not hesitated to push back on behalf of the American people, American values or American companies. Most importantly, President Obama has not allowed problems in one area of the relationship to undermine cooperation in others, nor has he allowed U.S. hopes for bilateral cooperation to hold him back from getting tough where needed. To make this intricate balancing act possible, the President has made high-level communication with China a top priority. In his first term, President Obama met with General Secretary Hu Jintao on an almost quarterly basis.

President Obama is dedicating significant time and resources to U.S.-China relations because he recognizes that this bilateral relationship could not be more important for global peace and prosperity. That is one of the reasons why the administration under Secretary Clinton’s leadership made the strategic decision to rebalance U.S. foreign policy from the Middle East to the Asia Pacific. The Asia-Pacific rebalance signifies a realization that it is time for the United States to dedicate more of its diplomatic, financial and security resources toward the opportunities of the future. We can expect new Secretary of State John Kerry and other new members of the President’s foreign policy team to continue moving forward with the broad contours of this strategy.

In Beijing, some observers have expressed concern that the U.S. rebalance is an attempt to contain a rising China. This is not the case. In reality, the rebalance aims to shape a regional order that will actually enable China’s peaceful rise. As General Secretary Xi Jinping expressed on his last visit to Washington, history tells us that the rise of a new great power often leads to destabilization and conflict. In the U.S. view, the best way to avoid confrontation is to create an environment of predictable stability for all players in the region, including China. Recently Secretary Panetta invited the PLA Navy to participate in RIMPAC 2014, the multinational Pacific Rim military exercise that occurs every other year. That type of inclusive cooperation is exactly what the rebalance aims to foster.

In terms of global challenges, the United States is making great efforts to cooperate with China on energy and climate change, and those efforts will continue. In President Obama’s first term the United States and China launched new projects such as the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC) and the U.S.-China Shale Gas Resources Initiative. U.S. and Chinese leaders meet frequently to discuss the possibilities for deepening joint action on combatting global climate change, and we hope those discussions will lead to new progress in international forums such as the Montreal Protocol.      

To be sure, the U.S.-China relationship will continue to have its share of tensions in the years to come. On the economic front, many U.S. enterprises are still concerned about their ability to compete with Chinese counterparts on a level playing field. Last year the President created a special task force within the White House to address this issue, and we have seen the U.S. Trade Representative file a number of cases at the WTO. Protecting intellectual property is also a major concern for the United States. Growing U.S. concerns over cyber espionage are now out in the open and could prove to be one of the most contentious issues in the bilateral relationship. President Obama will continue to do everything in his power to enforce trade rules and protect American economic security. Those enforcement actions will not always be welcomed by Beijing.  

Regional security will provide another set of challenges. The first few months of 2013 have already produced major flashpoints in the East China Sea and on the Korean peninsula. The new foreign policy teams in the United States, China, Japan, South Korea and other nations around the region will have no time to waste this year. The stakes and the challenges are simply too high.  

Although 2013 brings many new leadership appointments, we already have strong frameworks in place to support frequent communication between U.S. and Chinese leaders on all of these challenging issues. One of our biggest successes in U.S.-China relations in recent years is the rich network of track one and track two dialogues that we have established on many important topics. Those existing connections will serve us well, in this leadership term and beyond.

John Podesta is Chair of the Center for American Progress.

The question is why China and U.S. put their differences aside and worked together to impose the toughest sanction? The answer largely lies in North Korea’s wanton nuclear program. Its successful rocket launch and third nuclear test alarmed both China and the U.S. With this wake-up call, both sides had to think of medium and long-term implications. Early in 2011, the formal Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned that North Korea’s missile loaded nuclear warhead could reach the U.S. mainland in five years. China also had to consider the scenarios of a fierce arms race, an enhanced U.S. military posture, Japan’s military buildup, and a missile defense threat in East Asia. In spite of different reasons, they have the imperative to curb North Korea’s actions. 

The answer may partly lie in China’s policy changes. The domestic atmosphere has become unfavorable towards North Korea’s war rhetoric and capricious behavior. More and more people are inclined to regard North Korea as a liability rather than a strategic asset. Disgusted with Pyongyang’s defiance, lack of gratitude and outdated thinking on nuclear weapons, the calls for a suspension of fuel and food supplies has grown louder and louder. In sum, North Korea’s nuclear program drove China closer to the U.S. side. 

China-US cooperation may not force North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, but it could slow down the pace of North Korea’s advancement of nuclear weapon and missile technology; the very purpose of Resolution 2094. With bilateral cooperation between China and US, North Korea may find it is harder to pit one power against the other. Hopefully they realize that the international community would not accept a nuclear country status, and acknowledge the illusion of possessing nuclear bombs. 

The bilateral cooperation on Resolution 2094 ushered in a good start for the bilateral relationship under the new Chinese leadership and President Obama’s second term. To achieve the goal of denuclearization and maintain peace and stability on Korea Peninsula, China and the US should grasp this opportunity and advance further cooperation. 

First, both sides need close cooperation on the implementation of Resolution 2094. To do this, continued exchange of information about North Korea’s financial transactions and suspicious ships and cargos is requested. China has to do more on export control and monitoring cross-border trade. Such measures may provoke criticism from North Korea, but it is a necessity to show China and the international community’s firm determination. 

Second, both sides should review their policies.  Besides harsh sanctions, Resolution 2094 also urged a peaceful, diplomatic and political resolution to the current situation and a resumption of the six-party talks. It is time for both sides to consider the “stick” vs. “carrot” options, and each country should consider the alternate tools available. For China, the task is turning its firm opposition into harsh action. For the U.S., the task is offering more carrots. The U.S. relies more on sticks and prefers to exert sanctions, but sanctions have proved insufficient, just as foreign minister Yang Jiechi said: “Sanctions are not the end of Security Council actions, nor are sanctions the fundamental way to resolve the relevant issues.” To break the stalemate, the leap day agreement of 2012 remains an option. Though the agreement was abandoned shortly after North Korea’s announcement of a rocket launch, its content remains appealing as a step to any serious dialogue. 

Third, both sides should consider the grand design or a package of solutions. The nuclear issue is intertwined with building Peace, thus nuclear talks and peace talks should be pushed together on two wheels. The nuclear issue is also linked with the Northeast Asia security environment. Both sides need to think about the nuclear issue in the broader regional and international context. Last week, North Korea scrapped armistice, amplified its threatening rhetoric and vowed to make a pre-emptive attack against the U.S. With high tension, the joint military exercise was staged again. The risk of an accidental military clash is increasing. Suppose another Choenan Incident and Yeonpyeong shelling happens, the situation would deteriorate rapidly. With bilateral cooperation, China and the U.S. may prevent the situation spiraling out of control. But it is high time for both sides, and other parties, to think big. 

Fourth, both sides should resume candid communication and coordination. The Obama administration adopted a policy of “strategic patience”, and shifted to military deterrence and trilateral coordination with South Korea and Japan. China wished to know why the U.S. shrugged off its own responsibility and played the blame game instead of engaging in constructive cooperation. The U.S. should not avoid its responsibility. The U.S. military presence in South Korea has brought insecurity to North Korea. The U.S. would not start normalization with North Korea after both Russia and China normalized relations with South Korea, which is an example of deep-rooted “hostile” policy towards North Korea. Such differences between both sides remain and need to be overcome. 

Sun Ru is research professor and Deputy Director of Institute of World Political Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.

It is a persistent notion in the United States that the RMB is undervalued because China has been running a persistent, huge trade surplus, especially with the US. And thus, the RMB is particularly undervalued against the dollar. However, this supposed cause-and-effect linkage is actually not well proven.

First, the same exchange rate can see different trade balances. The best case for analysis is the Eurozone. During the first eight months of 2012, Eurozone countries had a wide disparity in their trade balances. Germany had by far the largest trade surplus of €125.3 billion, followed by the Netherlands, €31 billion, and Ireland, €29.3 billion. France, on the other hand, had a huge trade deficit of €56.5 billion. Spain and Greece also had trade deficits of €23.8 billion and €10.2 billion respectively. As all of these countries share the same currency – the euro – nobody would think their currency is undervalued. Nevertheless, the fundamentals behind these trade balances is the export competitiveness, not the exchange rate of each country.

Second, RMB exchange rate fluctuations during the past 12 years did not bring about relevant trade balance changes in either global trade at large, or trade with the US in particular. From 2000 to 2004, when RMB was pegged to the dollar at 8.28, China’s global trade surplus was actually small, ranging from $24-32 billion. Ironically, during the period of 2005 to 2008, when RMB floated and appreciated by 21.2% against the dollar, global trade surplus shot up by 825% to $295.46 billion, contrary to the general notion that appreciation leads to a fall in trade surplus. Then, global trade surplus steadily shrank to $155.14 billion in 2011, despite RMB being pegged to the dollar during the first year and a half and floated again during the last one and a half years. Throughout the period examined, China’s trade surplus to the US continued to rise, regardless if RMB was pegged to the dollar or not. Therefore, other factors leading to China’s trade surplus changes need to be explored.

Third, US exports to China have out-performed exports to the rest of the world. From 1997 to 2011, US exports to the world grew by 115.3% from $687.60 billion to $1,480.67 billion. However, US exports to China grew nearly three times as fast, increasing by 710.9% from $12.81 billion to $103.88 billion. Again, conventional notions don’t work. Had the RMB been undervalued, US exports to China should have grown more slowly. Nevertheless, during the same period, US exports to China grew 27% faster than imports from China, while US exports to the world grew 15% more slowly than imports, a fact that cannot be explained by an “undervalued RMB”.

Fourth, the same exchange rate also saw tremendous differences in different export categories from the US to China. According to US Department of Commerce data, US exports to China grew by 5.8% during the first 9 months of 2012. Exports of agricultural products grew by a remarkable 45.4% and transportation equipment grew by 17.3%. On the other hand, exports of computers and electronics barely saw positive growth at 1.1%. Furthermore, exports of chemicals decreased by 0.5% and exports of machinery faced a significant fall of 9.3%. However, all export groups face the same RMB exchange rate.

Finally, with the same RMB exchange rate, China has trade deficits with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan; yet it maintains surpluses with the EU and US. According to China Customs statistics, during the first 10 months of 2012, China had a $24.91 billion trade deficit with Japan, $62.86 billion with South Korea and  $77.87 billion with Taiwan. Despite having the same exchange rate, China has a $100.94 billion and $182.56 billion trade surplus with the EU and US respectively. Again the RMB exchange rate cannot explain the differences in trade.

Interestingly, over the past year, China’s trade deficit with Japan fell by 39% from a year ago, yet its deficit with South Korea decreased by a mere 3% and increased by 5% with Taiwan. Apparently, the exchange rate is not the reason for these changes as each country faced the same RMB. These large disparities can be explained by a big fall in China’s imports from Japan following Japan’s encroachment upon China’s Diaoyu Island. Big disparities were also seen in China’s trade positions with the EU and US, with a fall of 16.7% in its surplus with the EU and a rise of 10.3% with the US. It is obviously not explained by the one RMB rate, but by the fall of China’s exports to the EU following the euro debt crisis.

He Weiwen is Co-director of the China-US/EU Study Center at the China Association of International Trade

Wu Zhenglong

As the American presidential campaign and the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China were over, the future development of the China-U.S. Relations, the most complex bilateral relations in today’s world, has drawn wide attention across the world.

After a stock-taking of Obama’s China policy in his first presidential tenure, it is not difficult to discern that the Obama Administration failed to engage China in a new way against the general background of economic globalization and political multipolarization, due to its inadequate understanding of the difficulty and complexity of the China-U.S. Relations. The Americans swung to the extremity of “Asia Pivot” (changed to “re-balancing” this year) from humming “we are in the same boat”, and fanning up the ideas of “G2″ in the mass media.

The U.S. pursues manifold objectives in its “Pivot to Asia” policy, among which two carry the most weight. Firstly, the U.S. intended to speed up domestic economic recovery by taking the ride of the group rise of the emerging Asia powers and shift of the economic center of gravity from the west to the east where the economic development is burgeoning. Secondly, the U.S. wished to balance the increasing influence of China in the Asia Pacific region.

With a weak economic recovery dampened by high debt, high deficit, and high unemployment, the first objective should have been promoted as the key option. However, except for the “Trans-Pacific Partnership” with an unpredictable prospect, the U.S. fell short of any relevant measures in this field. On the other hand, the China factor was amplified disproportionately to become the pillar of the strategy only to cause serious strategic aftermaths.

East Asia is known for its complicated security situation. To aggravate it, the U.S. announced to deploy 60% of its warships to the Asia Pacific region by 2020, held joint military activities frequently aiming at China, sold arms to its allies and partners resulting in accelerating arms race in the region, and intensified territorial disputes through de facto support for one side, such as over the disputes between Japan and China, and over the South China Sea dispute. The intensified gaming between China and the U.S. created serious impacts on the bilateral relationship.

In addition, the U.S throwing its dead weight in this patch of the world also implies greater strategic risks. Currently, the European Union is still broiled in its debt crisis, while the Middle East chaos is going on, Against this backdrop, the U.S has its strengths “shrunk” to the relatively stable Asia Pacific region. This move of U.S. “ignoring” these areas will bring some risks to the US strategic interests. The recent assault on the U.S. Ambassador in Libya and the anti-American wave in the Middle East have exemplified this risk.

Despite the difficulty in bilateral relations caused by the US pivot to Asia policy, China sticks to its commission to peaceful development and a win-win situation with the US. Both sides have made efforts for better cooperation. The heads of states of China and the U.S. met 11 times in the past three years, and the two sides have established over 60 bilateral dialogue mechanisms at different levels and in various areas; The two countries are the biggest trade partner to each other with the bilateral trade volume registering US$446.6 billion in 2011 and hopefully to surpass US$500 billion in 2012; over three million visits between the two countries are exchanged each year.

Looking ahead, it is the author’s view that the cooperation between China and the U.S. will be enhanced continuously while competition will get intensified simultaneously. The two countries should make sure that the cooperation be conducted in a mutually beneficial and win-win way, while competition be a course of benign interaction. To avoid repeating the historical mistake of big power antagonism and zero-sum game, the sole correct option is to develop a new type of relationship between the two countries.

When visiting the U.S. in last February, Xi Jinping called for an “unprecedented and inspiring” type of relationship between the two countries, which was positively echoed by the U.S. side. President Obama stressed that the U.S. “welcomes China’s peaceful rise”, indicating that the U.S. and China can prove to the world that the two countries will not repeat the tragedy in history in developing bilateral relationship. Secretary of the State Hilary Clinton also suggested to “find a new answer to the ancient question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet”.

Now in 21st century, China and the U.S. have the following basis to open a new road to the new type of relationship between the two countries:

First, the sustained development of globalization has bound up the whole world into a new scenario of unprecedented interdependence and overlapping interests. The development and prosperity of one country is not only good to the country per se but also benefitial to other countries. A lot of human security and survival threats become global issues and their solutions go beyond the capacity of a single country and call for international cooperation. Thus, ,mutual respect and mutual benefit become the common goal of various countries.

Secondly, China is not the former Soviet Union and will not seek to expand its ideology and overturn the existing international system. With incompatible international concepts, the U.S. and the Soviet Union once established two parallel and antagonistic camps. But now, China and the U.S. are in the same international system, espousing the same rules both at the economic and political levels. Furthermore, from the perspective of the two countries’ strategic options, China hopes to get further incorporated in the existing international system instead of building a new one, while the U.S. wants to pull China further in this international system instead of kicking her out. Therefore, China and the U.S. will not tread the old route once taken by the U.S. and Soviet Union in those old days.

Thirdly, the international system accommodating both China and the U.S. is “open” in nature. In the post-crisis era, the international system is experiencing a paradigm shift that has never happened in many years of the past. The “openness” of the international system created by the great changes has further abated the possibility of the zero-sum game engaging China and the U.S. This provides China and the U.S. with more opportunities to build a new type of cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship.

However, we shall not underestimate the overwhelming pessimism existing in both countries on the China-U.S. relationship, though the leaders of the two countries have said to reach the consensus to build a new type cooperative relationship. One main reason for this pessimism is that people have found a gap between what the US officials have said and what their actual policies and activities imply to the public.

To bridge this gap, both China and the U.S. need to think creatively, act substantially, in the spirit of mutual trust, equality and understanding so as to cultivate a mature relationship based on trust. Chinese leader Xi Jinping has pointed out recently that we should not only have the resolve and confidence to “climb to the top of the Great Wall”, but also the patience and wisdom of “crossing the river by feeling the stones” in order to shape a new type of relationship between China and the U.S. This ought to be the direction of the development of the China-U.S. relations in coming years.

Wu Zhenglongis a research fellow of China Foundation for International Studies.

It is a persistent notion in the United States that the RMB is undervalued because China has been running a persistent, huge trade surplus, especially with the US. And thus, the RMB is particularly undervalued against the dollar. However, this supposed cause-and-effect linkage is actually not well proven.

First, the same exchange rate can see different trade balances. The best case for analysis is the Eurozone. During the first eight months of 2012, Eurozone countries had a wide disparity in their trade balances. Germany had by far the largest trade surplus of €125.3 billion, followed by the Netherlands, €31 billion, and Ireland, €29.3 billion. France, on the other hand, had a huge trade deficit of €56.5 billion. Spain and Greece also had trade deficits of €23.8 billion and €10.2 billion respectively. As all of these countries share the same currency – the euro – nobody would think their currency is undervalued. Nevertheless, the fundamentals behind these trade balances is the export competitiveness, not the exchange rate of each country.

Second, RMB exchange rate fluctuations during the past 12 years did not bring about relevant trade balance changes in either global trade at large, or trade with the US in particular. From 2000 to 2004, when RMB was pegged to the dollar at 8.28, China’s global trade surplus was actually small, ranging from $24-32 billion. Ironically, during the period of 2005 to 2008, when RMB floated and appreciated by 21.2% against the dollar, global trade surplus shot up by 825% to $295.46 billion, contrary to the general notion that appreciation leads to a fall in trade surplus. Then, global trade surplus steadily shrank to $155.14 billion in 2011, despite RMB being pegged to the dollar during the first year and a half and floated again during the last one and a half years. Throughout the period examined, China’s trade surplus to the US continued to rise, regardless if RMB was pegged to the dollar or not. Therefore, other factors leading to China’s trade surplus changes need to be explored.

Third, US exports to China have out-performed exports to the rest of the world. From 1997 to 2011, US exports to the world grew by 115.3% from $687.60 billion to $1,480.67 billion. However, US exports to China grew nearly three times as fast, increasing by 710.9% from $12.81 billion to $103.88 billion. Again, conventional notions don’t work. Had the RMB been undervalued, US exports to China should have grown more slowly. Nevertheless, during the same period, US exports to China grew 27% faster than imports from China, while US exports to the world grew 15% more slowly than imports, a fact that cannot be explained by an “undervalued RMB”.

Fourth, the same exchange rate also saw tremendous differences in different export categories from the US to China. According to US Department of Commerce data, US exports to China grew by 5.8% during the first 9 months of 2012. Exports of agricultural products grew by a remarkable 45.4% and transportation equipment grew by 17.3%. On the other hand, exports of computers and electronics barely saw positive growth at 1.1%. Furthermore, exports of chemicals decreased by 0.5% and exports of machinery faced a significant fall of 9.3%. However, all export groups face the same RMB exchange rate.

Finally, with the same RMB exchange rate, China has trade deficits with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan; yet it maintains surpluses with the EU and US. According to China Customs statistics, during the first 10 months of 2012, China had a $24.91 billion trade deficit with Japan, $62.86 billion with South Korea and  $77.87 billion with Taiwan. Despite having the same exchange rate, China has a $100.94 billion and $182.56 billion trade surplus with the EU and US respectively. Again the RMB exchange rate cannot explain the differences in trade.

Interestingly, over the past year, China’s trade deficit with Japan fell by 39% from a year ago, yet its deficit with South Korea decreased by a mere 3% and increased by 5% with Taiwan. Apparently, the exchange rate is not the reason for these changes as each country faced the same RMB. These large disparities can be explained by a big fall in China’s imports from Japan following Japan’s encroachment upon China’s Diaoyu Island. Big disparities were also seen in China’s trade positions with the EU and US, with a fall of 16.7% in its surplus with the EU and a rise of 10.3% with the US. It is obviously not explained by the one RMB rate, but by the fall of China’s exports to the EU following the euro debt crisis.

He Weiwen is Co-director of the China-US/EU Study Center at the China Association of International Trade

Since Mr. Penn was put in charge of “strategic and special projects” at Microsoft in August, much of his job has involved efforts to trip up Google, which Microsoft has failed to dislodge from its perch atop the lucrative Internet search market.

Drawing on his background in polling, data crunching and campaigning, Mr. Penn created a holiday commercial that has been running during Monday Night Football and other shows, in which Microsoft criticizes Google for polluting the quality of its shopping search results with advertisements. “Don’t get scroogled,” it warns. His other projects include a blind taste test, Coke-versus-Pepsi style, of search results from Google and Microsoft’s Bing.

The campaigns by Mr. Penn, 58, a longtime political operative known for his brusque personality and scorched-earth tactics, are part of a broader effort at Microsoft to give its marketing the nimbleness of a political campaign, where a candidate can turn an opponent’s gaffe into a damaging commercial within hours. They are also a sign of the company’s mounting frustration with Google after losing billions of dollars a year on its search efforts, while losing ground to Google in the browser and smartphones markets and other areas.

Microsoft has long attacked Google from the shadows, whispering to regulators, journalists and anyone else who would listen that Google was a privacy-violating, anticompetitive bully. The fruits of its recent work in this area could come next week, when the Federal Trade Commission is expected to announce the results of its antitrust investigation of Google, a case that echoes Microsoft’s own antitrust suit in the 1990s. A similar investigation by the European Union is also wrapping up. A bad outcome for Google in either one would be a victory for Microsoft.

But Microsoft, based in Redmond, Wash., has realized that it cannot rely only on regulators to scrutinize Google — which is where Mr. Penn comes in. He is increasing the urgency of Microsoft’s efforts and focusing on their more public side.

In an interview, Mr. Penn said companies underestimated the importance of policy issues like privacy to consumers, as opposed to politicians and regulators. “It’s not about whether they can get them through Washington,” he said. “It’s whether they can get them through Main Street.”

Jill Hazelbaker, a Google spokeswoman, declined to comment on Microsoft’s actions specifically, but said that while Google also employed lobbyists and marketers, “our focus is on Google and the positive impact our industry has on society, not the competition.”

In Washington, Mr. Penn is a lightning rod. He developed a relationship with the Clintons as a pollster during President Bill Clinton’s 1996 re-election campaign, when he helped identify the value of “soccer moms” and other niche voter groups.

As chief strategist for Hillary Clinton’s unsuccessful 2008 campaign for president, he conceived the “3 a.m.” commercial that raised doubts about whether Barack Obama, then a senator, was ready for the Oval Office. Mr. Penn argued in an essay he wrote for Time magazine in May that “negative ads are, by and large, good for our democracy.”

But his approach has ended up souring many of his professional relationships. He left Mrs. Clinton’s campaign after an uproar about his consulting work for the government of Colombia, which was seeking the passage of a trade treaty with the United States that Mrs. Clinton, then a senator, opposed.

“Google should be prepared for everything but the kitchen sink thrown at them,” said a former colleague who worked closely with Mr. Penn in politics and spoke on condition of anonymity. “Actually, they should be prepared for the kitchen sink to be thrown at them, too.”

Hiring Mr. Penn demonstrates how seriously Microsoft is taking this fight, said Michael A. Cusumano, a business professor at M.I.T. who co-wrote a book about Microsoft’s browser war.

“They’re pulling out all the stops to do whatever they can to halt Google’s advance, just as their competition did to them,” Professor Cusumano said. “I suppose that if Microsoft can actually put a doubt in people’s mind that Google isn’t unbiased and has become some kind of evil empire, they might very well get results.”

cohen

NCIRLIK AIR BASE, Turkey — Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta signed an official deployment order on Friday to send 400 American military personnel and two Patriot air defense batteries to Turkey as its tensions intensify with neighboring Syria, where government forces have increasingly resorted to aerial attacks, including the use of ballistic missiles, to fight a spreading insurgency.

The main reason is the huge shift already underway in the politics of energy and oil. The change has been underappreciated. It may be summed up in a single sentence buried in the 166-page study [pdf] just published by the U.S. National Intelligence Council: “By 2020, the U.S. could emerge as a major energy exporter.”

That is just eight years away and, yes, you read that right, exporter of energy, not importer. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the United States imports around 8 million barrels of crude oil a day, so the predicted turnabout is dramatic. With those imports, notably those from the Middle East, go forms of political dependency and expediency that have long exacted a price on the United States.